Accounting Reporting Complexity and Non-GAAP Earnings Disclosure
研究了强制性会计披露的复杂性是否促使经理人自愿披露调整后的实际盈利指标，发现会计复杂性越高，经理人越倾向于披露非GAAP盈利信息，且这种披露有助于减轻会计复杂性对投资者的信息不透明影响。
ABSTRACT We examine whether the complexity of mandatory accounting disclosures prompts managers to voluntarily disclose adjusted measures of actual earnings performance, and whether this practice reflects attempts to obfuscate or mitigate the informational opacity accounting complexity creates for investors. Using the metadata in XBRL filings, we construct measures of accounting complexity that map directly to the mandated standards applied in financial statement filings. We find a positive and economically significant association between accounting complexity and managers’ propensity to disclose non-GAAP earnings information. This relation is robust and incremental to common measures of business and linguistic complexity, and the transitory nature of firms’ economic activities. We also find that the quality and informativeness of adjusted earnings information increases with accounting complexity, consistent with motives to better inform investors when accounting disclosures are complex. Overall, our results suggest that managers use non-GAAP earnings disclosure to mitigate the adverse informational effects of accounting complexity. Data Availability: All data are available from sources identified in the paper. JEL Classifications: M41; M43.