Equilibrium existence in games with ties
简化了Reny（1999）的更好回应安全性条件在贝叶斯博弈中的应用，并利用这些条件证明了仅在“平局”处出现收益不连续性的几类博弈（包括全支付竞赛、共同价值第一价格拍卖和不完全信息霍特林模型）的均衡存在性。
We provide conditions that simplify applying Reny's (1999) better‐reply security to Bayesian games and use these conditions to prove the existence of equilibria for classes of games in which payoff discontinuities arise only at “ties.” These games include a general version of all‐pay contests, first‐prize auctions with common values, and Hotelling models with incomplete information.