Actuarial fairness and social welfare in mixed-cohort tontines
研究了混合年龄组唐提式养老金中的精算公平问题，设计了一种最大化集体期望效用的社会最优方案，并与现有方案比较优劣。
We study actuarial fairness in tontines with heterogeneous cohorts. For a given tontine, we show that both collective and individual actuarial fairness can be achieved. While it is impossible to design a tontine scheme with mixed cohorts that is optimal (utility-maximizing) for each single cohort (Milevsky and Salisbury (2016), Chen et al. (2021d)), we design a socially optimal tontine that maximizes the collective's expected utility which is characterized through a weighted sum of individual utility functions. In particular, we compare the resulting collectively optimal tontine to existing schemes in the literature, and identify similarities and differences as well as potential (dis-)advantages.