Economic Consequences of Transparency Regulation: Evidence from Bank Mortgage Lending
研究了2015年TRID规则简化抵押贷款披露后，银行减少抵押贷款审批，转而增加小企业贷款，而金融科技公司填补了抵押贷款需求缺口。
ABSTRACT We examine the economic consequences of a rule designed to improve consumers' understanding of mortgage information. The 2015 TILA‐RESPA Integrated Disclosures rule (TRID) simplifies the mortgage disclosures provided to consumers. As a consequence, TRID‐affected mortgages become a less attractive investment opportunity to banks. Our main results document that mortgage applications affected by TRID are less likely to be approved following the rule's effective date. We find evidence consistent with both a decrease in consumers' information processing costs and an increase in banks' secondary market frictions, providing insight into the potential channels through which this reduction in mortgage credit operates. We also find that banks partially compensate for reduced mortgage lending by increasing small business lending, and that fintechs absorb mortgage demand in areas with reduced mortgage lending by banks. Our study documents real actions that firms take in response to disclosure transparency regulation and contributes to the literature on the economic consequences of such regulation.