(Why) Do Central Banks Care about Their Profits?
研究发现，中央银行更倾向于报告微利而非微亏，尤其在政治压力大、公众易接受极端政治观点、行长可连任时。这种倾向与更高通胀和更低利率相关，表明央行存在代理问题，影响政策选择与结果。
ABSTRACT We document that central banks are discontinuously more likely to report slightly positive profits than slightly negative profits, especially when political pressure is greater, the public is more receptive to extreme political views, and central bank governors are eligible for reappointment. The propensity to report small profits over small losses is correlated with higher inflation and lower interest rates. We conclude that there are agency problems at central banks, which give rise to discontinuous profit incentives that correlate with central banks’ policy choices and outcomes. These findings inform the debate about the political economy of central banking and central bank design.