Strategic supply management and mechanism choice in government debt auctions: An empirical analysis from the Philippines
利用菲律宾约500次国债拍卖的投标数据，研究了战略拍卖者在歧视性拍卖和统一价格拍卖中的供应管理决策，发现歧视性拍卖降低借贷成本但集中中标者，且供应限制受借贷成本和需求强度驱动。
We examine bond auctions in the Philippines by using bid data from around 500 Treasury auctions. The Philippines features a strategic auctioneer who uses both discriminatory and uniform-price auctions, and actively manages supply. Here, discriminatory auctions generate lower borrowing costs, at the expense of concentrating awards among fewer bidders. We observe that the decision to restrict supply is driven by borrowing cost and strength of demand. Bidders adjust for winner’ s curse by submitting bids with higher yield spreads in response to higher volatility and more competitors. Though bidder heterogeneity exists, average auction profits do not significantly differ across bidder types.