Linking friction, social coordination and the speed of evolution
研究在协调博弈中，个体同时选择行动和建立有成本链接时的社会协调与网络形成，发现链接摩擦（不能同时改变所有链接）会改变均衡性质，并加速高收益策略的涌现。
We consider a model of social coordination and network formation where agents decide on an action in a coordination game and on whom to form costly links with. We explore the role of linking friction, where an agent cannot change all of her links simultaneously when choosing an alternative linking decision. Given linking friction, interaction structures are not fully flexible. We introduce a new solution concept of static equilibria, local Nash equilibria, and find that the set of local Nash equilibria may include action-heterogenous strategy profiles. Furthermore, risk-dominant strategy profiles are stochastically stable when linking friction is restrictive, and payoff-dominant strategy profiles are stochastically stable when linking friction becomes less restrictive. More importantly, linking friction can greatly accelerate the emergence of payoff-dominant strategy profiles.