Buyers’ Sourcing Strategies and Suppliers’ Markups in Bangladeshi Garments
研究了孟加拉服装出口商对不同采购策略买家（关系型与现货型）的加价差异，发现关系型买家订单的加价更高，并用不完全契约模型解释这一现象。
Abstract We study differences in markups earned by Bangladeshi garment exporters across buyers with different sourcing strategies and make three contributions. First, we distinguish buyers with a relational versus a spot sourcing strategy and show that a buyer’s sourcing strategy is correlated across products and origins. Buyer fixed effects explain most of the variation in sourcing strategies, suggesting that these depend on organizational capabilities. Second, we use novel data that match quantities and prices of the two main variable inputs in the production of garments (fabric and labor on sewing lines) to specific export orders. We derive conditions under which these data allow measurement of within exporter-product-time differences in markups across orders produced for different buyers. Third, we show that exporters earn higher markups on otherwise identical orders produced for relational, as opposed to spot, buyers. A sourcing model with imperfect contract enforcement, idiosyncratic shocks to exporters, and buyers that adopt different sourcing strategies trading off higher prices and reliable supply rationalizes this and other observed facts in the industry. We discuss alternative explanations and policy implications.