Gender-targeted transfers by default? - Evidence from a child allowance reform in Sweden
利用瑞典儿童津贴改革中的生日断点，发现默认将津贴发放给母亲会显著提高长期内资金流向母亲账户的概率，并实际向分居的低收入母亲再分配资源，但对育儿责任分工无显著影响。
• We examine the effects of disbursing child transfers to mothers by default. • Mothers and fathers are equally entitled; we vary the default disbursement option. • “Gender targeting by default” largely affects the long run disbursement division. • The 100%-to-the-mother default redistributes money to separated low-income mothers. • The nudge does not seem to affect the division of childcare responsibilities. We exploit a sharp birthday discontinuity in a large and universal Swedish cash transfer program, creating plausibly exogenous variation in the default disbursement option, while holding entitlements and other financial incentives constant. When the cash transfer is paid out to the mother by default, instead of a 50/50 default, it has a large effect (55 percentage points) on the probability that the transfer is deposited in the mother's bank account also in the long run. Surprisingly, we find that the default policy redistributes resources to separated low-income mothers. We find no indications that the 100%-to-the-mother default induces mothers to work less or to take more responsibility for the children.