Tax curvature
研究在Mirrlees环境下，税收曲率如何影响劳动力市场结果，发现更凹的税收计划提高劳动供给弹性从而提升工资，并推导出最优边际税率在低收入时递减的公式。
In a Mirrleesian environment, a monopsonist sets hourly wages and individuals choose how many hours to work. Labor market outcomes do not only depend on the level and slope of the income tax function, but also on its curvature. A more concave tax schedule raises the elasticity of labor supply, which boosts wages. Consequently, optimal marginal tax rates for low-skilled workers are declining in income. I derive an optimal tax formula in terms of sufficient statistics that accounts for the impact of tax curvature on labor market outcomes. Numerical simulations suggest that optimal marginal tax rates decline rapidly at low incomes.