The Effect of Negative Expectancy Violations and Relational Familiarity on Client Managers’ Negotiation Positions
通过实验研究发现，当审计师提出的调整超出客户经理预期时，客户经理对熟悉审计师的反应更强烈，会减少让步；而对不熟悉审计师的违背则反应较弱。
ABSTRACT During the interactive process of issue resolution, client managers may develop expectations about the auditor’s position. We examine the effect that negative expectancy violations have on managers’ pre-negotiation positions and how relational familiarity can moderate this effect. Through a series of experiments, we find that, when the partner’s proposed adjustment is within the client’s original expectations, managers offer greater concessions to a more familiar partner than to a less familiar partner. However, depending on relational familiarity, client managers react to expectancy violations very differently. Managers react more severely when a more familiar partner violates expectations, offering lower negotiation concessions than when no violation occurs. In contrast, managers tend to ignore violations committed by a less familiar partner, offering similar negotiation concessions whether or not a violation has occurred. Furthermore, we find support for a practical intervention to repair damage from expectancy violations committed by more familiar partners.