Does Discipline Decrease Police Misconduct? Evidence from Chicago Civilian Allegations
利用芝加哥数据，研究发现对警察不当行为的行政认定（即指控成立）会显著减少该警察未来的不当行为，且这种效果并非源于停职或消极怠工，而是源于监督和警察对晋升、薪酬等利益的考量。
Reformers are calling for greater oversight of police behavior, in part through enhanced use of civilian complaints. However, others counter that greater oversight could chill effective policing. We assess police officer response to administrative determinations of misconduct. Using Chicago data, we find strong evidence that a sustained allegation reduces that officer’s future misconduct. We find no evidence that this effect is driven by incapacitation, such as assignment to desk duty, or by officer disengagement. We conclude that our findings are most consistent with improved officer conduct, in part from oversight and officer concerns over promotion, salary, and desirable assignments.