When Do Politicians Appeal Broadly? The Economic Consequences of Electoral Rules in Brazil
利用巴西选举的断点回归设计，对比单轮与两轮选举制，发现两轮制激励候选人争取更广泛选民支持，并更均衡地提供公共品（如学校资源），对理解选举规则的经济影响有参考价值。
Electoral rules determine how voters’ preferences are aggregated and translated into political representation. Using a regression discontinuity design, I contrast single- and two-round elections in Brazil. In two-round elections, the eventual winner must obtain at least 50 percent of the vote. I show that two-round elections provide incentives for candidates to secure a broader base of support and provide public goods more broadly. Candidates represent a more geographically diverse group of voters, public schools have more resources, and there is less variation in resources across schools. Effects appear to be driven by strategic responses of candidates rather than differential entry into races.