Efficient Consolidation of Incentives for Education and Retirement Savings
研究了针对现时偏向型个体的最优税收政策，发现最优扭曲随教育状态变化，并提出了通过收入关联学生贷款和退休政策来鼓励人力资本投资与储蓄的方案。
We study optimal tax policies with human capital investment and retirement savings for present-biased agents. Agents are heterogeneous in their innate ability and make risky education investments, which determines their labor productivity. We demonstrate that the optimal distortions vary with education status. In particular, the optimal policy encourages human capital investment with savings incentives. Our implementation uses income-contingent student loans and existing retirement policies, augmented by a new tax instrument that subsidizes retirement savings for college graduates. The instrument mimics the latest policy proposals by allowing employers to offer 401(k) matching contributions proportional to student loans repayment.