Price commitment and the strategic launch of a fighter brand
研究了在位企业为阻止新进入者而推出战斗机品牌时，如何通过价格承诺（如固定价格公告或通过中间商分销）来使这一策略有效，并分析了市场吸引力对最优模式的影响。
Abstract We consider a vertically differentiated market where an incumbent strategically wants to launch a fighter brand to thwart a new entrant. Without a credibly commitment this launch is ineffective because the incumbent always has an incentive to price the fighter brand ex-post out of the market. Endogenous price leadership with fixed or list price announcement, and dual channeling with an intermediary retailer to distribute the fighter brand are analyzed as commitment devices. The optimal mode then depends on customers’ sensitivities to a deviation from the price announcement as well as on the attractiveness of the underlying market.