Multiple‐Principal Demands and CEO Compliance in Emerging Market State‐Owned Enterprises
研究了新兴市场国有企业中，CEO在面临政府相关委托人的商业、社会和私人三类要求时的遵从条件，并提出了一个多委托代理理论的概念框架。
Abstract This study addresses multiple‐principal–agent power dynamics in state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) in emerging markets. We investigate under what conditions agents (CEOs) accede to demands of government‐linked principals. Our qualitative study in Indonesia advances agency theory by disaggregating and categorizing government‐linked principals. We also examine three types of principals’ demands (commercial, social, and private) and five types of mechanisms influence agent responses with principals’ private demands (collusion among prin‐cipals, career‐ending threats by principals, plausible deniability through CSR, political ties as enabler, political ties as buffer). Based on our findings and on insights from the public adminis‐tration literature, we develop a conceptual framework that advances multiple agency theory.