The limits of multi-dealer platforms
研究发现，在多交易商平台上，交易商策略性地回避竞争，导致客户联系更多交易商反而会得到更差的价格，均衡时客户只联系两家交易商，平台促进价格竞争的能力有限。
On many important multi-dealer platforms, customers mostly request quotes from very few dealers. I build a model of multi-dealer platforms, where dealers strategically choose to respond to or ignore a request. If the customer contacts more dealers, each dealer responds with a lower probability and offers a stochastically worse price when responding. Dealers' strategic avoidance of competition overturns the customer's benefit from potentially receiving more quotes, worsening her best-overall price. In equilibrium, the customer contacts only two dealers. Multi-dealer platforms have limited ability to promote price competition: No design of information disclosure can improve the customer's payoff above this outcome.