稳定共享

Stable sharing

Games and Economic Behavior · 2023
被引 6
人大 AABS 3

中文导读

提出一个简单模型,代理人两两配对完成单位任务,偏好单峰且连续。设计Select-Allocate-Match算法生成稳定且帕累托有效的分配,并指出若偏好不满足单峰或连续性,稳定分配可能不存在。

Abstract

We propose a simple model in which agents are matched in pairs in order to complete a task of unit size. The preferences of agents are single-peaked and continuous on the amount of time they devote to it. Our model combines features of two models: assignment games (Shapley and Shubik (1971)) and the division problem (Sprumont (1991)). We provide an algorithm (Select-Allocate-Match) that generates a stable and Pareto efficient allocation. We show that stable allocations may fail to exist if either the single-peakedness or the continuity assumption fail.

稳定分配帕累托效率匹配算法单峰偏好