Promotions, Adverse Selection, and Efficiency
研究了逆向选择如何影响员工流动和岗位分配的效率，发现信息不对称导致高能力员工无法通过跳槽获得晋升，而“不晋升就离职”合同能有效应对这一低效问题。
We consider how adverse selection affects the efficiency of turnover and postturnover job assignments. In the model, when a high-ability worker is not promoted at the worker’s current employer because of a lack of available managerial openings, it is efficient for the worker to move to a firm seeking a high-ability worker to promote. But this type of turnover does not occur given asymmetric information and adverse selection. We show that up-or-out contracts can be an efficient response to this inefficiency, where our analysis matches several observations concerning real-world promotion decisions and practices related to up-or-out.