Social Transfers and Spatial Distortions
研究了美国各州差异化的社会转移支付如何扭曲家庭居住地选择，量化了由此导致的4.88%转移支付效率损失，并评估了跨州统一政策与收入指数化改革的改进效果。
US social transfer programs vary substantially across states, incentivizing households to locate in states with more generous transfer programs. Furthermore, transfer formulas often decrease in income, thereby rewarding low-income households for living in low-paying cities. We quantify these distortions by combining a spatial equilibrium model with a detailed model of transfer programs in the United States. The current system leads to locational inefficiency of 4.88% of total transfer spending. A reform that both harmonizes transfer policies across states and indexes household income to local average earnings reduces this inefficiency by more than 60% while preserving the programs’ means-tested nature.