The role of personal and impersonal relational contracts on partner selection and efficiency
通过实验室实验，研究了不同合同执行力和市场竞争环境下，个人化与非个人化关系契约对市场效率的影响。个人契约通过促进信任提升效率，非个人契约则通过便于更换交易伙伴提高效率。
Abstract In this article, we use a laboratory experiment to study the effects of relational contracts on market efficiency in environments with different degrees of contract enforceability and market competition. By exogenously varying the communication protocol, we create relational contracts that are more personal or impersonal. On the one hand, personal relational contracts improve efficiency by promoting trust and coordination. On the other hand, impersonal relational contracts increase efficiency by facilitating the severance of trading relationships when more productive competitors enter the market. Therefore, the overall effect on market efficiency depends on the relative importance of competition and agreement enforceability.