Bank competition and the design of syndicated loans
研究了银行竞争如何影响银团贷款条款，发现贷款市场集中度越高，贷款利率越高、规模越大、期限越短、合同更复杂且更可能要求抵押品，但绩效定价条款也更常见。
Abstract We study the effect of bank competition on the design of syndicate loans. We find that competition in the lead lender's market plays a significant role in determining the terms of the syndicate loans. Specifically, higher concentration leads to higher yield spreads, larger issues, shorter maturities, greater contract intensity, and more collateral requirements, but with a greater likelihood of performance pricing. We also find the prior banking relationships, anti‐takeover provisions and whether the lead bank is a national, regional, or state bank influence the designs of these loans.