Trust in Risk Sharing: A Double-Edged Sword
研究了当偏离合作的价值由另一个风险分担安排内生决定时，信任如何影响风险分担效率。信任既促进联盟形成，又因便利偏离而收紧激励约束，可能造成资源或效用浪费。
Abstract We analyse efficient risk-sharing arrangements when the value from deviating is determined endogenously by another risk-sharing arrangement. Coalitions form to insure against idiosyncratic income risk. Self-enforcing contracts for both the original coalition and any coalition formed (joined) after deviations rely on a belief in future cooperation which we term “trust”. We treat the contracting conditions of original and deviation coalitions symmetrically and show that higher trust tightens incentive constraints since it facilitates the formation of deviating coalitions. As a consequence, although trust facilitates the initial formation of coalitions, the extent of risk sharing in successfully formed coalitions is declining in the extent of trust and efficient allocations might feature resource burning or utility burning: trust is indeed a double-edged sword.