The Impact of Nonfamily CEOs on Family Firms’ Pursuit of Political Connections: The Theory of Bounded Reliability Perspective
研究非家族CEO如何影响家族企业建立政治关联，基于中国上市家族企业数据，发现非家族CEO会减少企业聘请有政治关系的经理和董事，且受组织与环境因素调节。
This study investigates the effect of nonfamily chief executive officers (CEOs) on family firms’ propensity to form political connections. We combine research on corporate political activity and family business and draw from the bounded reliability theory to analyze how the presence of a nonfamily CEO is related to the hiring of politically connected managers and board members. We further examine how our base hypothesis is contingent upon the organizational and environmental factors influencing nonfamily CEOs’ bounded reliability. Using the data from publicly listed Chinese family firms, support for our model was found. The study advances the understanding of family firms’ political activity.