Optimal parental leave subsidization with endogenous fertility and growth
在一个包含人力资本外部性的生命周期王朝模型中，研究了育儿假补贴的增长和福利效应，发现外部性导致生育率过高、育儿时间和支出不足，最优政策需补贴带薪育儿假，基于美国数据的校准显示，每名父母7.8周全薪假可使年增长率提高0.06个百分点，福利提高0.027%。
Abstract We examine the growth and welfare effects of parental leave subsidization in a life‐cycle dynastic model with human capital externality. Such externality causes higher fertility, less parental time and expenditure on child human capital, and lower growth and welfare than the efficient levels. Efficient policies require subsidizing work leave, which includes parental leave, and labor income financed by a lump‐sum tax. Calibration based on the U.S. data implies that a fully‐covered leave duration of 7.8 weeks per parent financed by an increase in labor income tax would increase the annual growth rate by 0.06 percentage points and welfare by 0.027%.