Price and quantity discovery without commitment
研究了新西兰电力批发市场在无承诺机制下，通过指示性价格和数量发现能否提供有用信息，发现其信息性逐步增强且投标修订符合信息更新逻辑。
Wholesale electricity markets solve a complex allocation problem: electricity is not storable, demand is uncertain, and production involves dynamic cost considerations and indivisibilities. The New Zealand wholesale electricity market attempts to solve this complex allocation problem by using an indicative price and quantity discovery mechanism that ends at dispatch. Can such a market mechanism without commitment provide useful information? We document that indicative prices and quantities are increasingly informative of the final prices and quantities and that bid revisions are consistent with information-based updating. We argue that the reason why the predispatch market is informative despite the lack of commitment is that it generates private benefits in terms of improved intertemporal optimization of production plans.