On the existence of private unemployment insurance with advance information on future job losses
研究了在工人有未来失业提前信息导致逆向选择的动态经济中，私人失业保险市场能否盈利，发现排除违约者一年可使市场有利可图，政策制定者可建立违约记录库来促进市场发展。
We study the existence of a profitable unemployment insurance market in a dynamic economy with adverse selection rooted in workers’ advance information on future job losses. The new feature of the model is that the insurer and workers interact repeatedly. Repeated interactions make it possible to threaten workers with exclusion from future insurance benefits after a default on insurance premia. With exclusion, the insurer can offer not only insurance against unemployment risk itself but also against bad news about a future job loss. We discipline our model with estimates of the willingness to pay for unemployment insurance and the costs of adverse selection in the US. Our quantitative results illustrate that private unemployment insurance could be profitable for an exclusion length of one year. To stimulate the emergence of a private unemployment insurance market, policymakers can facilitate the creation of a registry that archives past defaults on insurance premia.