Earnings expectations and the quality of financial services
利用消费者向消费者金融保护局投诉银行的数据，研究发现银行在勉强超过分析师盈利预测后的季度，客户投诉平均增加13.3%，这主要由银行削减非利息支出驱动，且与CEO激励薪酬比例正相关。
Using complaint data filed by consumers with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau against financial institutions, we show that banks receive, on average, 13.3% more customer complaints in the quarter immediately after they narrowly beat analysts’ earnings forecasts. The effect is mainly driven by banks’ attempts to reduce their non-interest expenses to beat earnings benchmarks. The relationship is stronger when bank CEOs receive a greater proportion of incentive-based compensation. Overall, our paper demonstrates how capital market incentives exacerbate shareholder–customer conflicts.