The behavioral economics of dynamically inconsistent behavior: a critical assessment
批判性地讨论了经济学中偏好变化的概念化，指出“现时偏向”与“状态依赖”两种偏好概念在规范含义上截然不同，但实证上难以区分，并警告父爱主义干预可能因概念灵活而沦为仁慈的专制。
Abstract Preferences often change—even in short time intervals—due to either the mere passage of time (present-biased preferences) or changes in visceral or environmental conditions (state-dependent preferences). On the basis of empirical findings concerning state-dependent preferences, we critically discuss the “Aristotelian” view of unitary decision makers in economics. We illustrate that the conceptualization of preferences as “present-biased” as opposed to “state-dependent” has very different normative implications for which preferences should be considered “rational.” Empirically, however, the two concepts are very difficult to distinguish. The economist can justify any paternalistic intervention if she can conceptualize changing preferences so flexibly, and she can easily become a benevolent despot. We therefore urge for a more careful “Heraclitean” view of decision-making that accepts that a person may consist of multiple selves.