Quasi-Insider Shareholder Activism: Corporate Governance at the Periphery of Control
研究了准内部人（创始人、前高管等与公司有间接关联的个人）发起的股东积极主义，发现他们采用激进策略、瞄准业绩差的小公司，且公告回报为正，表明控制边缘的內部人可能介入传统积极主义者忽视的小公司。
Abstract We analyze shareholder activism by “quasi-insiders”: founders, former executives, and other individuals tangentially connected to a firm. These individuals seek control in their campaigns, use aggressive tactics, and target smaller, poorly performing firms. Their campaigns are associated with positive announcement returns. Former CEOs who engage in campaigns often depart from the target under negative circumstances before launching their campaigns soon afterward. Our results suggest that insiders at the periphery of control may intervene in firms too small for traditional activists to target.