Solving Serial Acquirer Puzzles
本文提出一种新的连续收购者分类法，发现不同类型收购者的收购动因、目标规模不同，且后续收购可事前预测。控制市场预期后，高频连续收购者并未出现递减回报，而低频收购者则相反。该方法有助于理解连续收购动态、预期及经济价值调整。
Abstract Using a novel typology of serial acquirers, we examine several puzzles documented in the prior literature. We show that acquisitions by different types of acquirers are driven by different factors, they acquire different sizes of targets, and subsequent acquisitions by acquirers are predictable ex ante. Controlling for market anticipation, the most frequent serial acquirers do not earn declining returns as they continue acquiring, while less frequent acquirers do. Our methodology enhances our understanding of serial acquisition dynamics, anticipation, and economic value adjustments. The methodology is likely to be relevant to topics related to event anticipation beyond those covered in this study.