Pay-for-delay settlements and patent expansion practices
研究了延迟付款和解与专利扩展行为（如抢先申请专利、产品跳转和常青化）之间的战略替代关系，发现当专利强度信息不对称且专利强度内生时，禁止延迟付款可能反而降低消费者剩余。
Pay-for-delay (reverse payments) settlements and patent expansion practices (PEP), such as preemptive patenting, product hopping and evergreening, have been criticized for their potential anticompetitive effects. This paper shows that reverse payments and PEP are strategic substitutes and, when the information over the patents’ strength is asymmetric and patents’ strength is endogenous, a ban on reverse payments may reduce consumer surplus . This effect is stronger the more generic competition reduces industry profits. When the cost of using PEP is sufficiently high, a ban on reverse payments is optimal, otherwise it is optimal to allow reverse payments at the minimal level consistent with the originator not engaging in PEP. Results are qualitatively robust to allowing PEP to increase patent quality and consumer surplus.