Analyst coverage, executive compensation and corporate risk‐taking: Evidence from property–casualty insurance firms
利用券商关闭和合并导致的分析师覆盖外生下降，研究其对不透明行业（财产责任保险）企业风险承担的影响，发现风险上升，且受高管薪酬激励、企业不透明度和投保人监督强度影响。
Abstract Using an exogenous drop in analyst coverage introduced by broker closures and mergers, we test for the causal impact of analyst coverage on corporate risk‐taking, in an opaque industry. We document an increase in risk using several book‐based and market‐based risk measures, including tail and default risk measures. Results are driven by firms with stronger managerial risk‐taking compensation incentives. The increase in risk is stronger in more opaque firms, and firms with weaker policyholder monitoring. Firm risk increases through at least one risk‐taking action, such as investing firm assets in higher‐risk bonds. Our study highlights the importance of stock analysts in affecting corporate risk‐taking, especially in the presence of stronger managerial, compensation risk‐taking incentives.