Reserve Accumulation, Macroeconomic Stabilization, and Sovereign Risk
提出一个理论解释新兴市场政府为何积累大量国际储备，尤其是固定汇率制国家。模型显示，主权风险与总需求放大相互作用，使储备起到宏观经济稳定对冲作用：好时期发债购储，可在主权利差上升、债务展期变贵时稳定总需求。实证证据支持模型预测。
Abstract In the past three decades, governments in emerging markets have accumulated large amounts of international reserves, especially those with fixed exchange rates. This article proposes a theory of reserve accumulation that can account for these facts. Using a model of endogenous sovereign default with nominal rigidities, we argue that the interaction between sovereign risk and aggregate demand amplification generates a macroeconomic-stabilization hedging role for international reserves. We show that issuing debt to purchase reserves during good times allows the government to stabilize aggregate demand when sovereign spreads rise and rolling over the debt becomes more expensive. We provide empirical evidence consistent with the model’s predictions.