The causal effect of corporate governance on employee satisfaction
利用股东对反收购条款的投票作为外生冲击，发现股东权利每增加1点，员工满意度下降10%，原因包括企业文化、CEO评价、员工人数和资本支出的减少。
Abstract We investigate the causal effect of increasing shareholder rights on employee satisfaction. To ensure causality, we use close shareholder votes on antitakeover provisions included in the Entrenchment Index (E‐Index) as exogenous shocks to the corporate governance of a company. A 1‐point increase in shareholder rights on the E‐Index scale causes a 10% decrease in employee satisfaction. The channels that drive our results are decreases in employees' opinion about firm culture, in their view about the company's CEO, in the number of employees, and in capital expenditures.