Collateral and bank screening as complements: A spillover effect
研究抵押贷款对无抵押贷款的溢出效应，发现高质量借款人提供更多抵押品会促使银行提高对低质量借款人的利率，从而增强银行筛选动机，改善无抵押贷款质量。
I analyze a novel spillover effect from collateralized to uncollateralized loans. High-type borrowers have good projects, while low-type borrowers do not know their project quality. High-type borrowers post collateral, and a monopolist bank screens only low-type borrowers' projects. Different from existing models, equilibrium collateral requirements are stricter than the minimum necessary to achieve separation, despite costly collateral. When high-type borrowers post more collateral, the bank charges a higher interest rate to low-type borrowers. This enhances the bank's incentives to screen the low-types' projects, thereby improving the average quality of uncollateralized loans.