Optimal Bank Regulation in the Presence of Credit and Run Risk
修改了Diamond-Dybvig模型，研究银行在提供流动性服务、发放风险贷款并面临挤兑风险时，如何偏离社会最优，并提出了三项监管措施来纠正扭曲。
We modify the 1983 Diamond and Dybvig model so that banks offer liquidity services to depositors, raise equity funding, make risky loans, and invest in safe, liquid assets. Banks monitor borrowers to ensure that they repay loans and they are susceptible to depositor runs. We model the run decision by solving a novel global game. Relative to a social planner, banks opt for a more deposit-intensive capital structure, their assets may be more or less lending intensive, and the level of lending may be higher or lower. Correcting these three distortions requires a package of three regulations.