The structure of representative preference
在萨缪尔森加总环境中，刻画了将凹效用映射为凹代表性效用函数的社会福利函数，以及将拟凹效用映射为拟凹代表性效用函数的社会福利函数，后者仅适用于广义最大最小社会福利函数。
In an environment of Samuelsonian aggregation, we characterize those social welfare functions which ( i ) map concave utility profiles to concave representative utility functions and ( ii ) map quasiconcave utility profiles to quasiconcave representative utility functions. Case ( i ) holds for any concave social welfare function, while case ( ii ) holds only for generalized maxmin social welfare functions. Lastly, we establish a simple duality result for computing the representative utility under a maxmin social welfare function: the representative expenditure function is the sum of the individual expenditure functions, which we use to study the aggregation of generalized Leontief utilities.