Time‐consistent fair social choice
研究了当个体偏好异质且不可人际比较时，如何构建跨期社会福利评价，发现帕累托原则、时间一致性与减少不平等的公平公理存在冲突，并引入考虑历史责任的公平形式，刻画了历史依赖的最大最小和词典序最小社会福利准则。
In this paper, we study intertemporal social welfare evaluations when agents have heterogeneous preferences that are interpersonally noncomparable. We first show that even if all agents share the same preferences, there is a conflict between the axioms of Pareto principle, time consistency, and equity requiring society to reduce inequality regardless of the past. We argue that responsibility for past choices should be taken into account and, thus, the equity axiom is not compelling. Then we introduce another form of equity that takes the past into consideration and is compatible with time consistency. Using this form of equity and time consistency, we characterize maximin and leximin social welfare criteria that are history‐dependent.