Information Spillover in Multi-Good Adverse Selection
研究一个拥有私人信息的卖家在两个市场交易两种不同商品时，买家从其他市场交易结果中获取信息所导致的信息溢出效应，发现负相关条件可减少效率损失，并识别出一种导致多重均衡的协调摩擦。
This paper analyzes information spillover in a multi-good adverse selection model in which a privately informed seller trades two different goods in two different markets. Buyers learn the seller’s information from both the market they participate in and the trading outcomes in the other market. We identify a sufficient negative correlation condition under which information spillover reduces efficiency loss. We also discover a novel type of coordination friction that leads to multiple equilibria, which can be welfare-ranked by the number of initial no-trade periods. When the sufficient negative correlation condition fails, the efficiency loss is the same as in the case without information spillover.