Foreseen risks
研究发现，大型危机常紧随快速信贷扩张之后，但因果关系并不明显。模型显示，当金融中介最优地利用驱动其特许权价值的经济租金时，这种模式自然出现。该模型为发达经济体中非常规货币政策的效果提供了新见解。
Large crises tend to follow rapid credit expansions. Causality, however, is far from obvious. We show how this pattern arises naturally when financial intermediaries optimally exploit economic rents that drive their franchise value. As this franchise value fluctuates over the business cycle, so too do the incentives to engage in risky lending. The model leads to novel insights on the effects of unconventional monetary policies in developed economies. We argue that bank lending might have responded less than expected to these interventions because they enhanced franchise value, inadvertently encouraging banks to pursue safer investments in low-risk government securities.