Self-Reported Signaling
研究了当行动由发送者自我报告而非公开观察时，自我报告如何作为生产率信号，发现自我报告可能逆转传统信号模型中的过度投资结论，甚至可能改善福利。
In many real-world settings, an action that affects the value of a product or service is self-reported rather than publicly observable. We investigate self-reporting when self-reports serve as a signal of sender productivity. In our model, a sender chooses an action and then sends a message concerning the action to multiple receivers. Receivers then bid for the sender’s service after deciding whether to audit the sender. We find that self-reporting can reverse the standard result in signaling models that there is overinvestment in the action and that the possibility of misrepresentation may in fact improve welfare given self-reported signaling.