Competition for Attention and News Quality
研究了新闻媒体数量增加但质量下降的现象，提出消费者注意力分配影响新闻机构质量选择的模型，发现新进入者加剧竞争会分散注意力，降低现有机构提升质量的动力。
Over the past decades the number of news outlets has increased dramatically, but the quality of news products has declined. We propose a model to reconcile these facts where consumers’ attention allocation decisions not only depend on but also affect news outlets’ quality choices. When competition is intensified by new entries, the informativeness of the news industry rises. Thus, attention is diverted from existing outlets, reducing their incentives to improve news quality, which begets a downward spiral. Furthermore, when attention becomes cheaper, a larger number of news outlets can be accommodated in equilibrium, but news quality still falls.