ESG disclosure, CEO power and incentives and corporate risk‐taking
研究了美国公司中ESG披露对企业风险承担的影响，发现ESG披露降低了基于会计和市场回报的风险承担，且CEO权力会增强这一效果，而CEO的ESG激励奖金则会削弱。
Abstract This paper investigates the impact of environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure on corporate risk‐taking and how this impact is further affected by chief executive officer (CEO) power and incentives within US companies. We find that ESG disclosure decreases corporate risk‐taking based on both accounting‐based and market‐based returns. Further, we find that ESG disclosure is more effective in mitigating market‐based risk‐taking than accounting‐based risk‐taking in a firm with a powerful CEO. In contrast, CEO's ESG‐incentivized engagement bonuses weaken ESG disclosure impacts in reducing both types of risk‐taking. Our analysis helps understanding of different trade‐offs of ESG disclosure in aligning all stakeholders' benefits under different managerial‐related factors.