Political directors and company performance: An empirical investigation of industry‐level and country‐level moderating effects
基于欧洲大型上市公司纵向样本，研究发现政治董事对公司绩效有负面影响，但行业监管和信贷型金融体系能正向调节这一关系，为资源依赖理论提供了情境化理解。
Abstract The existing empirical evidence on the political directors' impact on company performance is mixed and inconclusive, suggesting that this relationship is more complex than initially hypothesised and requires further investigation. This study enhances our knowledge by exploring both political directors' direct effects and the role of moderating contextual variables. Precisely, building on resource dependence and contingency theory, we argue that political directors can positively affect company performance and that this relationship may be moderated by industry regulation and national financial systems. We tested our hypotheses using a longitudinal sample of large European listed companies. Our results highlight that political directors have a detrimental effect on firm performance, while industry regulation and credit‐based financial systems positively moderate this baseline relationship. As such, our findings expand the use of resource dependence theory and provide a more contextual understanding of the impact of political directors on firm performance.