The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice
比较了防策略且稳定的延迟接受算法、防策略且帕累托最优的顶交易循环算法与排名最小化机制在择校中的结果，发现排名最小化机制在排名效率和最差学生安置上显著优于前两者，且产生的合理嫉妒少于顶交易循环算法。
We compare the outcomes of the most prominent strategy-proof and stable algorithm (Deferred Acceptance, DA) and the most prominent strategy-proof and Pareto optimal algorithm (Top Trading Cycles, TTC) to the allocation generated by the rank-minimizing mechanism (RM). While one would expect that RM improves upon both DA and TTC in terms of rank efficiency, the size of the improvement is nonetheless surprising. Moreover, while it is not explicitly designed to do so, RM also significantly improves the placement of the worst-off student. Furthermore, RM generates less justified envy than TTC. We corroborate our findings using data on school admissions in Budapest.