Financial Reporting Quality and Myopic Investments: Theory and Evidence
通过理论和实证发现，更高的财务报告质量会激励管理者进行短视投资，即减少无形资产投资，尤其是在投资者对盈余反应增强和股东期限较短时，这种投资降低是低效的。
ABSTRACT We present theory and empirical evidence that greater financial reporting quality can incentivize myopic investments. In the model, greater financial reporting quality increases investor response to earnings, elevating the manager’s incentive to invest myopically to improve earnings. Using the setting of Big N auditors’ acquisitions of non-Big Ns, which increased investor response to earnings for the acquired client firms, we find evidence supporting myopic investments. Specifically, acquired clients decrease intangible investments, particularly when (1) the increase in investor response to earnings is larger and (2) the horizon of shareholders is shorter. The investment decrease is inefficient, as evidenced by reduced profitability, fewer exploratory innovations, and other measures. JEL Classifications: G14; G34; M41; M42; O31; O34; N22.