Measuring Deterrence Motives in Dynamic Oligopoly Games
提出一种分解方法，量化动态寡头博弈中的威慑动机，并以多伦多咖啡连锁店为例，发现星巴克在特定市场中高达43%的进入动机源于威慑。
This paper presents a novel decomposition approach for measuring deterrence motives in dynamic oligopoly games. Our approach yields a formalized, scale-free, and interpretable measure of deterrence motives that informs researchers about the proportion for which deterrence motives account of all entry motives. In addition, the decomposition leads to a set of conditions for counterfactual analysis where hypothetical scenarios with deterrence motives eliminated can be explored. We illustrate the use of our measure and counterfactual by conducting an empirical case study about the dynamics of coffee chain stores in Toronto, Canada. The inferred deterrence motives suggest that a noticeable proportion of entry motives can be attributed to deterrence; it can be as high as 43% for the increasingly dominant coffee chain, Starbucks, in certain types of markets. Finally, counterfactual analysis confirms that deterrence motives are indeed associated with Starbucks’ aggressive presence as the number of its outlets and its market share are markedly lower once these motives are eliminated. This paper was accepted by Matthew Shum, marketing. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4864 .