Strategic mistakes
研究决策摩擦的均衡影响，提出一种新的控制成本模型，涵盖事后错误、事前规划不完美等摩擦，并应用于货币商业周期和流动性陷阱中的消费储蓄模型。
To study the equilibrium implications of decision frictions, we introduce a new class of control costs in continuum-player, continuum-action games in which agents interact via an aggregate of the actions of others. The costs that we study accommodate a rich class of decision frictions, including ex post misoptimization, imperfect ex ante planning, cognitive constraints that depend endogenously on the behavior of others, and consideration sets. We provide primitive conditions such that equilibria exist, are unique, are efficient, and feature monotone comparative statics for action distributions, aggregates, and the size of agents' mistakes. We apply the model to make robust equilibrium predictions in a monetary business-cycle model of price-setting with planning frictions and a model of consumption and savings during a liquidity trap when endogenous stress worsens decisions.