Pay‐for‐delay with settlement externalities
研究了制药市场中，专利持有者通过向潜在进入者支付费用以延迟其进入市场的和解协议，如何导致所有竞争者被排除，并分析了禁止此类协议可能增加诉讼并损害消费者利益。
Abstract Pay‐for‐delay patent settlements, in which the incumbent patentee pays a potential entrant to withdraw a patent challenge and stay out of the market, cost patients and taxpayers billions of dollars in higher pharmaceutical prices. We show that in markets with one incumbent and several entrants, the possibility of conditioning such settlements on litigation outcomes against other entrants results in the exclusion of all entrants from the market. When conditional contracts are infeasible, the incumbent licenses the patent or fights entry in court: the resulting competition benefiting consumers. Prohibiting all pay‐for‐delay settlements increases litigation and may harm consumers by reducing licensing.